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INTRODUCTION 
The Internet increasingly offers a preferred medium for access 
to video and other types of high value content1 that may require 
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) to use special efforts to ensure 
                                                                                                                            
* Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law, Penn State 
University; 102 Carnegie Building, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802; (814) 863-7996; 
rmf5@psu.edu; web site: http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/r/m/rmf5 
1 Viewing of [Online Video Distributors] video programming on 
multiple devices is becoming increasingly prevalent. SNL Kagan 
estimates that as of 2013, more than 53 million U.S. households 
watched online programming with at least one Internet-connected 
device, including computers, game consoles, streaming media 
players, television sets, and Blu-ray players, with an average of 4.8 
such devices per online viewing household. 
In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of 
Video Programming, Sixteenth Report, 30 FCC Rcd. 3253, para. 10 (2015). 
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superior quality of service (“QOS”).2 ISPs have made substantial 
investments in infrastructure upgrades to satisfy growing demand 
for networks capable of delivering bandwidth intensive traffic at 
higher transmission speeds. Additionally, they work to accommo-
date consumer expectations of having content access anytime, an-
ywhere, through any medium, via any device, and in any screen 
presentation format. Early adopters of new video delivery technol-
ogies rely on both wireline and wireless alternatives to “legacy” 
media such as broadcast, cable, and satellite television. Consumers 
have declining tolerance for “appointment television”3 that limits 
access to a specific time, on a particular channel, and in a single 
presentation format. 
Already some video content consumers have “cut the cord” 
and abandoned traditional video media options replacing them with 
online platforms offering access to live content as well as streaming 
of stored content. The terms Internet Protocol Television 
(“IPTV”)4 and Over-the-Top Television (“OTT”)5 refer to the 
ability of content creators and new or existing content distributors 
                                                                                                                            
2 “OVDs account for an increasing portion of Internet traffic during peak hours. For 
instance, Sandvine states that Netflix accounted for 34.2 percent of peak period 
downstream traffic in March 2014, compared with 31.6 percent during the second half of 
2013.” Id. para. 11. 
3 “A secular trend toward narrowcasting has intensified on the web, as more 
individuals forsake appointment television for the ‘long tail’ of online content.” Frank 
Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in 
Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 110 (2010). 
4 IPTV offers consumers with broadband connections options to download video files 
or view (streaming) video content on an immediate “real time” basis. See In re Sky Angel 
U.S., LLC, Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 3879 (2010). Some of the available content duplicates 
what cable television subscribers receive therein triggering disputes over whether cable 
operators can secure exclusive distribution agreements and prevent an IPTV service 
provider from distributing the same content. “Sky Angel has been providing its 
subscribers with certain Discovery networks for approximately two and a half years, 
including the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Kids Channel, Planet Green, 
and the Military Channel. Sky Angel submits that these channels are a significant part of 
its service offering.” Id. para. 3. For background on IPTV, see In-Sung Yoo, The 
Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: How the Federal Communications 
Commission Should Abstain From Cable Service Regulation and Promote Broadband 
Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199 (2009). 
5 “Over-the-top VoIP [and other] services require the end user to obtain broadband 
transmission from a third-party provider, and providers of over-the-top [services] can 
vary in terms of the extent to which they rely on their own facilities.” In re Preserving the 
Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, para. 22 n.48 (2010). 
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to provide consumers with access to video content via broadband 
links, in lieu of, or in addition to, traditional media. New distribu-
tion media have the ability to deliver “mission critical” bits requir-
ing highly reliable conduits for the immediate (“real time”) trans-
mission of video content and their instantaneous display. IPTV and 
OTT can offer consumers new options for accessing “must see” 
video content,6 such as live sporting events. 
This Article assesses whether and how ISPs can offer QOS en-
hancements, at premium prices for full motion video, while still 
complying with the new open Internet rules and regulations estab-
lished by the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC” 
or the “Commission”) in March, 2015.7 This Article explains that 
having made the controversial decision to reclassify all forms of 
Internet access as a telecommunications service, the FCC increases 
regulatory uncertainty. In particular, the FCC has evidenced skep-
ticism whether ISPs, providing retail first- and last-mile broadband 
service to residential subscribers,8 can offer QOS enhancements 
that serve real consumer wants, without harming competition and 
the ability of most content to arrive on a timely basis using conven-
                                                                                                                            
6 Video has greater potential to cause disruptions in service in light of the substantial 
amount of content that ISPs must handle quickly so that frames of content arrive in time 
for immediate display. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Technologies of Storytelling: New Models for 
Movies, 10 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 106, 132 (2010). 
7 In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, 
Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet 
Order]; see also In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Order Denying Stay 
Petitions, 30 FCC Rcd. 4681 (2015) [hereinafter Order Denying Stay] (order denying 
requested stay of the 2015 Open Internet Order). 
8 The FCC’s definition of broadband Internet access emphasizes the offering of 
service that reaches nearly all sources of content as opposed to services that offer 
enhanced delivery for specific sources of content. 
[B]roadband Internet access service (BIAS) [is defined] as: [a] mass-
market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to 
transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet 
endpoints, including any capabilities that are incidental to and enable 
the operation of the communications service, but excluding dial-up 
Internet access service. This term also encompasses any service that 
the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the 
service described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade 
the protections set forth in this Part. 
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 187. 
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tional “best efforts” routing.9 This Article suggests that the FCC 
expand its “narrow” waiver criteria10 to allow retail ISPs to join 
their upstream counterparts,11 and provide video delivery en-
hancements that do not degrade conventional best efforts routing, 
or prioritize traffic in ways designed to disadvantage competitors. 
I. THE FCC’S 2015 OPEN INTERNET ORDER 
In a controversial decision (the “2015 Open Internet Or-
der”),12 the FCC opted to reclassify elements of Internet access as 
                                                                                                                            
9 The Internet developed initially as an academic curiosity, based on a 
commitment to the “end-to-end principle.” This principle requires 
that all Internet traffic, whether an email, a Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) “call” or a video stream, be treated equally and 
managed through “best efforts” connections. In such a network, data 
packets pass from one router to another without the prioritization of 
any particular packets. In practice, this means that Internet traffic 
reaches its destination at varying times, depending on the traffic 
levels of the relevant Internet communications links. 
Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 280 
(2008). 
10 “Under the rule we adopt today, the Commission will ban all paid prioritization 
subject to a narrow waiver process.” 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 107. 
“We anticipate granting such relief only in exceptional cases.” Id. para. 132. 
11 The 2015 Open Internet Order maintains the largely unregulated information service 
classification for ISPs operating upstream from operators that provide “retail” broadband 
subscriptions. 
[Title II, common carrier regulated] broadband Internet access 
service does not include virtual private network (VPN) services, 
content delivery networks (CDNs), hosting or data storage services, 
or Internet backbone services (to the extent those services are 
separate from broadband Internet access service). The Commission 
has historically distinguished these services from “mass market” 
services and, as explained in the 2014 Open Internet NPRM, they 
“do not provide the capability to receive data from all or substantially 
all Internet endpoints.” We do not disturb that finding here. 
Id. para. 190 (citations omitted). 
12 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7; see also Joint Brief for Petitioners United 
States Telecom Ass’n et al., United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, No. 15-1063 (D.C. 
Cir. July 30, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-334673A1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/WV2G-JCX2] [hereinafter USTelecom Joint Brief]; Motion for Stay or 
Expedition of USTelecom et al., United States Telecom Ass’n, No. 15-1063 (D.C. Cir. May 
13, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-333494A1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5YXF-FFX4]. 
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a Title II regulated, common carrier service13 with no distinction 
between wireline and wireless ISPs.14 The Commission will have to 
convince an appellate court the reclassification resulted from ra-
tional decision making based on a complete record evidencing sub-
stantially changed circumstances occurring in the ten years since 
2005, when the FCC opted to classify Internet access as an infor-
mation service.15 
The FCC emphasized the need for narrowly crafted rules de-
signed to “prevent specific practices we know are harmful to In-
ternet openness—blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization—as 
well as a strong standard of conduct designed to prevent the dep-
                                                                                                                            
13 See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 25. 
14 The FCC previously had imposed less stringent rules on wireless carriers in light of 
spectrum use, greater potential for congestion, and recent entry in broadband markets. 
The 2015 Open Internet Order treats wireless ISPs no differently than wireline ISPs: 
Today, we find that changes in the mobile broadband marketplace 
warrant a revised approach. We find that the mobile broadband 
marketplace has evolved, and continues to evolve, but is no longer in 
a nascent stage. As discussed below, mobile broadband networks are 
faster, more broadly deployed, more widely used, and more 
technologically advanced than they were in 2010. We conclude that it 
would benefit the millions of consumers who access the Internet on 
mobile devices to apply the same set of Internet openness protections 
to both fixed and mobile networks. 
Id. para. 88. 
15 “It is also well settled that we may reconsider, on reasonable grounds, the 
Commission’s earlier application of the ambiguous statutory definitions of 
‘telecommunications service’ and ‘information service.’” Id. para. 334. 
The [Supreme] Court’s application of [the] Chevron test in Brand X 
makes clear our delegated authority to revisit our prior interpretation 
of ambiguous statutory terms and reclassify broadband Internet 
access service as a telecommunications service. The Court upheld the 
Commission’s prior information services classification because “the 
statute fails unambiguously to classify the telecommunications 
component of cable modem service as a distinct offering. This leaves 
federal telecommunications policy in this technical and complex area 
to be set by the Commission.” Where a term in the Act “admit[s] of 
two or more reasonable ordinary usages, the Commission’s choice of 
one of them is entitled to deference.” The Court concluded, given 
the “technical, complex, and dynamic” questions that the 
Commission resolved in the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, “[t]he 
Commission is in a far better position to address these questions than 
we are.” 
Id. para. 332 (citations omitted). 
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loyment of new [anticompetitive] practices that would harm Inter-
net openness.”16 The Commission emphasized that ISPs have both 
the incentive and ability to leverage access in ways that can thwart 
innovation and investment in the Internet ecosystem: 
The key insight of the virtuous cycle is that broad-
band providers have both the incentive and the abili-
ty to act as gatekeepers standing between edge pro-
viders and consumers. As gatekeepers, they can 
block access altogether; they can target competitors, 
including competitors to their own video services; 
and they can extract unfair tolls.17 
The FCC also emphasized that while subjecting ISPs to Title 
II, common carrier oversight, the Commission will use its statutory 
authority quite narrowly as evidenced by the decision to forbear18 
from applying “27 provisions of Title II of the Communications 
Act, and over 700 Commission rules and regulations.”19 The 
Commission recognized the need to explain how the new require-
                                                                                                                            
16 Id. para. 4. 
17 Id. para. 20. 
18 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2013) authorizes the FCC to streamline the scope of its Title II 
oversight by forbearing from applying many common carrier requirements: 
[T]he Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation or any 
provision of this chapter to a telecommunications carrier or 
telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications carriers 
or telecommunications services, in any or some of its or their 
geographic markets, if the Commission determines that—(1) 
enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure 
that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in 
connection with that telecommunications carrier or 
telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are not 
unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2) enforcement of such 
regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of 
consumers; and (3) forbearance from applying such provision or 
regulation is consistent with the public interest. 
19 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 5. The major provisions of Title II that 
the 2015 Open Internet Order will apply are: nondiscrimination and no unjust and 
unreasonable practices under sections 201 and 202; authority to investigate complaints 
and resolve disputes under section 208 and related enforcement provisions, specifically 
sections 206, 207, 209, 216, and 217; protection of consumer privacy under section 222; 
fair access to poles and conduits under section 224; protection of people with disabilities 
under sections 225 and 255; and providing universal funding for broadband service, but 
not the requirement to collect contributions to such funding through partial application of 
section 254. 
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ments satisfy pressing needs, but in the most narrow and well cali-
brated matter in light of virulent opposition from most ISPs and 
two Republican Commissioners.20 The 2015 Open Internet Order 
reports that: 
[T]here will be fewer sections of Title II applied 
than have been applied to Commercial Mobile Ra-
dio Service (CMRS) [the regulatory classification 
for wireless voice telecommunications service], 
where Congress expressly required the application 
of [s]ections 201, 202, and 208, and permitted the 
Commission to forbear from others. In fact, Title II 
has never been applied in such a focused way.21 
In addition to the specific prohibitions on blocking, throttling, 
and paid prioritization, the FCC established a general prohibition 
on ISP practices that would unreasonably interfere with or disad-
vantage downstream consumers and upstream edge providers of 
content, applications, and services.22 The Commission will consid-
er on a case-by-case basis whether an ISP has engaged in a practice 
“that unreasonably interfere[s] with or unreasonably disadvan-
tage[s] the ability of consumers to reach the Internet content, ser-
vices, and applications of their choosing or of edge providers to 
access consumers using the Internet.”23 
The Commission opted to apply more open-ended evaluative 
criteria than the legal standard requiring proof of commercial rea-
sonableness it had previously proposed.24 The Commission con-
cluded that it should “adopt a governing standard that looks to 
whether consumers or edge providers face unreasonable interfe-
rence or unreasonable disadvantages, and makes clear that the 
standard is not limited to whether a practice is agreeable to com-
mercial parties.”25 
                                                                                                                            
20 Id. paras. 4–5, 192. 
21 Id. para. 38. 
22 See id. para. 108. 
23 Id. para. 135. 
24 See In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, para. 136 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Open Internet 
NPRM]. 
25 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 150. The FCC identified a number of 
factors it will consider in future evaluations. These factors include an assessment of 
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The FCC also opted to use a “no-unreasonable interfe-
rence/disadvantage” standard to evaluate controversial subjects 
including the lawfulness of “sponsored data” arrangements where 
an ISP accepts advertiser payment in exchange for an agreement 
not to meter and debit its broadband subscribers for the down-
stream traffic delivery.26 The Commission also will use this stan-
dard to consider the lawfulness of data caps that tier service by bit 
transmission speed and the amount of permissible downloading 
volume.27 In both instances, the FCC sees the potential for an ISP 
to create artificial scarcity to extract higher revenues and to favor 
corporate affiliates and third parties willing to pay a surcharge.28 
Additionally, the FCC views data caps as possibly handicapping 
OTT/IPTV vendors of video programming that compete with an 
ISP service, but use the ISP network to deliver content to consum-
ers.29 Conversely, the Commission recognizes that some types of 
service tiering can promote innovation and new, customized ser-
vices.30 
The 2015 Open Internet Order expresses the view that reclassi-
fying Internet access as a telecommunications service provides the 
strongest legal foundation for network neutrality regulations, 
coupled with a secondary reference to section 706 of the Tele-
communications Act of 199631 and Title III of the Communications 
Act of 1934, as amended,32 which addresses the use of radio spec-
trum and applies common carriage regulation to wireless voice car-
                                                                                                                            
whether a practice allows end-user control and is consistent with promoting consumer 
choice, the competitive effects of a practice, whether consumers and opportunities for 
free expression are promoted or harmed, the effect on innovation, investment, or 
broadband deployment, whether the practice hinders the ability of end users or edge 
providers to use broadband access to communicate with each other, and whether a 
practice conforms to the best practices and technical standards adopted by an open, 
broadly representative, and independent Internet engineering, governance initiatives, or 
standards-setting organization. See id. paras. 139–45. 
26 See id. para. 152. 
27 See id. para. 153. 
28 See id. paras. 151–53. 
29 See id. para. 153. 
30 See id. para. 151. 
31 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2013). 
32 Id. §§ 301–399b. 
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riers.33 By using the stronger Title II foundation, the FCC asserts 
that it can establish clear and unconditional statutory authority, but 
also use the flexibility contained in Title II to forbear from applying 
unnecessary common carrier requirements just as the Commission 
had done for wireless telephone service. However, with a Title II 
regulatory foundation, the 2015 Open Internet Order makes it 
possible for the FCC to create an open Internet conduct standard 
that ISPs cannot harm consumers or content providers, coupled 
with enforcement tools available to sanction violations.34 The 
Commission’s decision to treat aspects of Internet access as com-
mon carriage has triggered a third judicial appeal and review of 
whether such reclassification constitutes a reasonable decision 
based on a complete evidentiary record.35 By opting for the reclas-
                                                                                                                            
33  We ground the open Internet rules we adopt today in multiple 
sources of legal authority—section 706, Title II, and Title III of the 
Communications Act. We marshal all of these sources of authority 
toward a common statutorily-supported goal: to protect and promote 
Internet openness as platform for competition, free expression and 
innovation; a driver of economic growth; and an engine of the 
virtuous cycle of broadband deployment. 
 We therefore invoke multiple, complementary sources of legal 
authority. As a number of parties point out, our authority under 
section 706 is not mutually exclusive with our authority under Titles 
II and III of the Act. 
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, paras. 273–74. 
34 With an eye toward providing timely, certain, and flexible enforcement of its open 
Internet rules, the FCC announced its intention to use advisory opinions similar to those 
issued by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. 
Advisory opinions will enable companies to seek guidance on the 
propriety of certain open Internet practices before implementing 
them, enabling them to be proactive about compliance and avoid 
enforcement actions later. The Commission may use advisory 
opinions to explain how it will evaluate certain types of behavior and 
the factors that will be considered in determining whether open 
Internet violations have occurred. Because these opinions will be 
publicly available, we believe that they will reduce the number of 
disputes by providing guidance to the industry. 
Id. para. 229. 
35 See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7; Order Denying Stay, supra note 7; see 
also USTelecom Joint Brief, supra note 12. 
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sification option, the FCC underscores the riskiness in imposing ex 
ante regulation36 without an explicit legislative mandate. 
A. Can ISPs Offer QOS Enhancement for IPTV? 
As the Internet has commercialized and diversified, intercon-
nection terms and conditions have changed between ISPs as they 
pursue alternatives to conventional models for securing the global 
carriage of traffic.37 Because no single ISP owns or leases all the 
network facilities needed to link any source of content with any 
customer of the ISP, traffic interconnection and compensation ar-
rangement provide necessary supplemental capacity. ISPs tradi-
tionally classified interconnection as either peering38 or transiting.39 
The former involves interconnection between high capacity carri-
ers whose transoceanic and transcontinental traffic volumes gener-
ally match, thereby enabling the carriers to barter network access in 
lieu of a financial settlement. Historically, smaller carriers have 
paid transit fees to larger ISPs for the opportunity to secure up-
stream links throughout the Internet cloud.40 
In light of growing demand for bandwidth intensive video con-
tent delivered via the Internet, traffic volume disparities have in-
creased between ISPs. Because most consumers download more 
                                                                                                                            
36 Ex ante rules and regulations anticipate the need for government-imposed 
safeguards to prevent anticompetitive practices in a specific sector of the economy, 
because of existing or potential harm to consumers and the national economy. 
37 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture that Challenge 
the Status Quo, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 84 (2010) (outlining new ISP 
interconnection variations of peering and transiting). 
38 “Peering” refers to a barter arrangement for traffic exchange where two Internet 
Service Providers agree to accept traffic from the other without the transfer of funds. The 
carriers agree to a settlement-free arrangement, because traffic volumes generally match. 
39 “Transiting” refers to an exchange of traffic that triggers a financial settlement and 
transfer of funds. This arrangement typically results when a small carrier needs the 
services of a larger carrier to reach all Internet carriers and end users. 
40 The “Internet cloud” refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make 
up the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the 
content available via these networks. “The increasing functionality of the Internet is 
decreasing the role of the personal computer. This shift is being led by the growth of 
‘cloud computing’—the ability to run applications and store data on a service provider’s 
computers over the Internet, rather than on a person’s desktop computer.” William 
Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under The Stored 
Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199 (2010). 
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traffic than they upload, expanding demand for downstream deli-
very of video content broadens the differential. A new category of 
carrier, commonly referred to as a Content Delivery Network 
(“CDN”),41 targets the downstream video content delivery mar-
ket, all but guaranteeing an asymmetrical traffic flow necessitating 
a financial settlement with retail ISPs instead of a simple barter 
agreement. CDNs incur transit charges, or have to negotiate other 
compensation arrangements with retail ISPs, because the down-
stream traffic requires flows to broadband subscribers from CDNs 
that far exceed the volume of traffic retail ISPs have available to 
hand off for upstream carriage. 
Such asymmetry in traffic flows can generate interconnection 
compensation disputes such as that which occurred for Netflix con-
tent between a major CDN, Level 3, and a major ISP, Comcast, 
which provides “last mile” delivery of Internet content to broad-
band subscribers.42 Content distributors, such as Netflix, also have 
pursued an alternative to using CDNs by securing a paid peering 
arrangement directly with Comcast,43 and by installing servers con-
taining the most popular content, closer to subscribers on the pre-
mises of a retail ISP.44 
                                                                                                                            
41 A CDN is an organized network of computers that are often placed 
“close” to Internet users. Commonly accessed content is then stored 
on those computers and requests by web users are directed to 
“nearby” or lightly loaded computers. Content distribution networks 
can be used to save bandwidth since the content for a popular item 
does not need to be fetched from a distant location. 
Dirk Grunwald, The Internet Ecosystem: The Potential for Discrimination, 63 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 411, 426 (2011). 
42 See, e.g., Daniel L. Brenner & Winston Maxwell, The Network Neutrality and the 
Netflix Dispute: Upcoming Challenges for Content Providers in Europe and the United States, 
23 No. 3 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (2011). 
43 See Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix to Pay Comcast for Smoother Streaming, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 23, 2014, 7:47 PM) http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304 
834704579401071892041790 [http://perma.cc/58FU-T2BH]. 
44 Content providers and distributors can opt to negotiate directly with retail ISPs for 
the right to install (“co-locate”) equipment on site, or alternatively secure the services of 
a company, such as Akamai, to negotiate, install, and maintain the equipment. Netflix has 
sought the direct negotiation option with ISPs. See Ken Florence, Announcing the Netflix 
Open Connect Network, NETFLIX: U.S. & CAN. BLOG (June 4, 2012), http://blog. 
netflix.com/2012/06/announcing-netflix-open-connect-network.html [http://perma.cc/ 
4SXH-8SYS]. 
82 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:71 
 
CDNs typically become transit payers even if previously they 
qualified for zero cost peering, but questions remain whether retail 
ISPs, such as Comcast, have an affirmative duty to try offsetting 
traffic imbalances. Likewise, consumers wonder what service 
commitments they deserve to receive from their retail ISPs that 
accrue sizeable monthly Internet access subscription revenues. The 
carriers respond that they have had to increase available network 
capacity and thereby enhance the value proposition of service de-
spite not receiving additional compensation from the ventures who 
cause massive increases in download volume, i.e., ventures such as 
Netflix and YouTube.45 
On occasion, retail broadband subscribers have experienced 
degraded service, particularly for bandwidth intensive applications 
such as full motion video streaming.46 Identifying the actual cause 
of such congestion remains elusive. Content creators and distribu-
tors speculate whether retail ISPs have deliberately caused conges-
tion, by refusing to make timely network capacity upgrades, or by 
allocating available capacity in ways that increase the probability of 
congestion for the traffic of specific content types and sources.47 
ISPs reject this scenario and cite to less nefarious circumstances 
such as weather, home-based holidays, and the decision of content 
distributors, such as Netflix, to release an entire season’s worth of 
                                                                                                                            
45 For example, Comcast has provided subscribers with increased bit transmission 
speeds, initially without a rate increase. See Comcast Increases Internet Speeds for 13th Time 
in 12 Years, COMCAST (April 9, 2014), http://corporate.comcast.com/news-information/ 
news-feed/comcast-xfinity-internet-speed-increase [http://perma.cc/X22B-QMWM]. 
46 See Drew Fitzgerald & Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix-Traffic Feud Leads to Video 
Slowdown, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2014, 9:35 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304899704579391223249896550 [http://perma.cc/6SVS-N5M2]. 
47 Five major internet service providers in the U.S. and one in Europe 
have been accused of abusing their market share to interfere with the 
flow of the internet for end users. The accusations come from Level 
3, a communications company that helps connect large-scale ISPs like 
Comcast or AT&T to the rest of the internet. According to the 
company, these six unnamed ISPs are deliberately degrading the 
quality of internet services using the Level 3 network, in an attempt to 
get Level 3 to pay them a fee for additional traffic caused by services 
like Netflix, a process known as paid peering. 
Andrew Webster, Major ISPs Accused of Deliberately Throttling Traffic, VERGE (May 6, 
2014, 10:06 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/5/6/5686780/major-isps-accused-of-
deliberately-throttling-traffic [http://perma.cc/3M7H-8FBL]. 
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a program instead of the conventional weekly release of just one 
episode.48 Consumers and regulators alike have no easy means for 
identifying the cause because multiple carriers participate in the 
complete routing of traffic from source to end user.49 Sophisticated 
network tracking techniques are needed to identify the weakest 
link—the network operating with the lowest available bandwidth 
and switching capacity, which can cause end users to experience 
delays in downloads and even dropped packets of content.50 Parties 
will disagree on the cause of congestion as well as the required re-
medy.51 
B. Regulatory Uncertainty 
The 2015 Open Internet Order provides a quite complex and 
uncertain assessment of IPTV traffic routing depending on what 
kind of venture handles the traffic, as well as its location in the se-
quence of network facilities linking content source and consumer. 
The FCC continues to treat the caching52 of video content by proxy 
                                                                                                                            
48 “The hit political drama series of Netflix kept about 60,000 subscribers glued onto 
their screens on Valentine’s Day to watch the whole 13-hour production. However, the 
shifting behavior of consumers to watch videos on demand over the Internet is causing 
some clogged pipes on the information highway.” Randell Suba, Netflix-Verizon Standoff: 
Only Net Neutrality Can Now Stop Video Slowdown, TECH TIMES (Feb. 23, 2014, 7:27 
AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/3670/20140223/netflix-verizon-standoff-only-
net-neutrality-can-now-stop-video-slowdown.htm [http://perma.cc/XJH9-YAR9]. 
49 See id. 
50 See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 85. 
51 If you are trying to get Netflix and use Verizon’s broadband, then 
there is a good chance that your video performance is less than 
optimal. Some Verizon customers might even go as far as calling it a 
crappy Netflix experience. The reason: a behind-the-scenes power 
play between Verizon and Cogent Communications, one of the largest 
bandwidth providers. 
Om Malik & Stacey Higginbotham, Having Problems with Your Netflix? You Can Blame 
Verizon, GIGAOM (June 17, 2013, 7:23 PM), https://gigaom.com/2013/06/17/having-
problems-with-your-netflix-you-can-blame-verizon/ [http://perma.cc/7KU3-6DQ8]; see 
also Dan Rayburn, Here’s How the Comcast & Netflix Deal Is Structured, With Data & 
Numbers, STREAMINGMEDIABLOG.COM (Feb. 27, 2014, 12:14 PM), http://blog. 
streamingmedia.com/2014/02/heres-comcast-netflix-deal-structured-numbers.html 
[http://perma.cc/QUZ3-HXSX]. 
52 “Caching is the storing of copies of content at locations in a network closer to 
subscribers than the original source of the content. This enables more rapid retrieval of 
information from websites that subscribers wish to see most often.” 2015 Open Internet 
Order, supra note 7, para. 356 n.973. 
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servers53 as an information service.54 CDNs can continue to distri-
bute video content across a wide geographical area in ways that re-
duce delay (latency) and improve overall QOS by reducing the 
number of networks and routers traversed.55 CDNs, such as Aka-
mai Technologies, offer services that appear to enhance consumer 
welfare without harming the marketplace of ideas or the competi-
tive marketplace for Internet content carriage services.56 
                                                                                                                            
53 An Internet Service Provider, considered here as an entity that 
operates a telecommunications network and provides access to the 
Internet, may also install a proxy server to deal with the requests sent 
by its users. 
 A proxy may serve many different purposes, for example, 
filtering the traffic. However, the key purpose I want to consider now 
is the one of saving bandwidth, and thus improving the efficiency of 
the network. An ISP can save bandwidth by means of a proxy by 
keeping a copy of the responses originated by previous requests, and 
using those copies to serve subsequent requests made by the same 
user or by a different one. This function is called “caching,” or more 
precisely “proxy-caching.” 
 A proxy that implements a caching function is known as a 
“caching proxy,” or a “proxy cache.” Caching proxies have been 
widely used by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to store copies of 
Web pages frequently requested by their users, so that they could 
show the cached copy to users that subsequently request the same 
Web page. 
Miquel Peguera, When the Cached Link is the Weakest Link: Search Engine Caches Under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 589, 603 (2009). 
54 “We adopt our tentative conclusion in the 2014 Open Internet NPRM that 
broadband Internet access service does not include virtual private network (VPN) 
services, content delivery networks (CDNs), hosting or data storage services, or Internet 
backbone services (to the extent those services are separate from broadband Internet 
access service).” 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 190. “The record in this 
proceeding leads us to the conclusion that providers today market and offer consumers 
separate services that are best characterized as (1) a broadband Internet access service 
that is a telecommunications service; and (2) ‘add-on’ applications, content, and services 
that are generally information services.” Id. para. 341. 
55 See id. para. 190. 
56 CDNs have become useful primarily because they provide a way to 
provide scalable service. The canonical example for this is the success 
that Victoria’s Secret (a retailer) had in hosting online content before 
and after using a commercial CDN. In the initial offering, demand for 
the retailer’s content exceeded the capabilities of its own web 
services, but successive offerings using a CDN were much more 
successful. 
Grunwald, supra note 41, at 426; see also AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES, THE BUSINESS 
INTERNET A PREDICTABLE PLATFORM FOR PROFITABLE E-BUSINESS (2004), 
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Additionally, the FCC does not apply its prohibition of block-
ing, throttling, and paid prioritization on ISPs operating upstream 
from last mile, retail ISPs.57 However, the Commission retains 
Title II jurisdiction to investigate and resolve interconnection dis-
putes between retail ISPs and both CDNs and upstream ISPs.58 
The FCC faces a major regulatory quandary in identifying in-
stances where it must intervene rather than allow arm’s length, 
commercial negotiations between ventures partnering in the deli-
very of video content from content source to end user. On one 
hand, the FCC noted the existence of several high visibility con-
flicts between content distributors, such as Netflix, and down-
stream ISPs, such as Comcast.59 The likelihood for disruption to 
consumers caused by these disputes appears to have motivated the 
FCC to deem both the downstream delivery to retail broadband 
subscribers and most of the routing of traffic upstream from retail 
ISPs as a telecommunications service.60 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.diku.dk/OLD/undervisning/2004e/358/Akamai_Business_Internet_White
paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PRD-VMK9]. 
57 See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 190. 
58 “[T]he Commission will be available to hear disputes regarding arrangements for the 
exchange of traffic with a broadband Internet access provider raised under sections 201 
and 202 on a case-by-case basis.” Id. para. 193. 
59 See id. para. 199. 
60 [W]e classify fixed and mobile broadband Internet access service as 
telecommunications services. The definition for broadband Internet 
access service includes the exchange of Internet traffic by an edge 
provider or an intermediary with the broadband provider’s network. 
We note that anticompetitive and discriminatory practices in this 
portion of broadband Internet access service can have a deleterious 
effect on the open Internet . . . . 
Id. para. 195. 
Broadband Internet access service involves the exchange of traffic 
between a last-mile broadband provider and connecting 
networks. . . . Thus, disputes involving a provider of broadband 
Internet access service regarding Internet traffic exchange 
arrangements that interfere with the delivery of a broadband Internet 
access service end user’s traffic are subject to our authority under 
Title II of the Act. 
Id. para. 204. 
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On the other hand, the FCC determined that it should not ap-
ply network neutrality rules to traffic upstream from retail ISPs,61 
and also that it should limit the scope of Title II safeguards availa-
ble for application to traffic exchanges between upstream CDNs 
and retail ISPs.62 The potential for regulatory intervention presents 
uncertainty for both the Commission and commercial ventures be-
cause no clear standard exists for understanding what constitutes 
unreasonable and anticompetitive “better than best efforts” 
routing and what does not. A retail ISP could create artificial con-
gestion as leverage to nudge or push a content distributor to more 
expensive, “premium” service, but this paid prioritization option 
might simply constitute a necessary safeguard to ensure high quali-
ty IPTV service even during instances where real congestion oc-
curs. 
While expressing support for commercially driven interconnec-
tion and compensation arrangements, the Commission does not 
provide sufficient guidance on when it would intervene to reverse 
or condition arrangements that might provide desirable QOS en-
hancements, but also trigger other public interest concerns.63 The 
Commission strongly implies a disinclination to grant paid prioriti-
zation waivers, but it appears almost exclusively concerned about 
last mile arrangements. 
                                                                                                                            
61 “[W]e conclude that, at this time, application of the no-unreasonable 
interference/disadvantage standard and the prohibitions on blocking, throttling, and paid 
prioritization to the Internet traffic exchange arrangements is not warranted.” Id. para. 
195. 
62 The definition for broadband Internet access service includes the 
exchange of Internet traffic by an edge provider or an intermediary 
with the broadband provider’s network. We note that anticompetitive 
and discriminatory practices in this portion of broadband Internet 
access service can have a deleterious effect on the open Internet, and 
therefore retain targeted authority to protect against such practices 
through sections 201, 202, and 208 of the Act (and related 
enforcement provisions), but will forbear from a majority of the other 
provisions of the Act. 
Id. 
63 “Internet traffic exchange agreements have historically been and will continue to be 
commercially negotiated. We do not believe that it is appropriate or necessary to subject 
arrangements for Internet traffic exchange (which are subsumed within broadband 
Internet access service) to the rules we adopt today.” Id. para. 202. 
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For example, Netflix and Comcast have agreed to a “paid peer-
ing” solution to traffic congestion.64 This arrangement provides 
higher quality service by reducing the use of other networks, there-
by expediting delivery of traffic even when congestion would de-
grade traffic over lines subject to traditional, best efforts routing.65 
Under a paid peering arrangement, traffic can arrive via the most 
advantageous means, resulting in less latency, fewer circuitous 
routing arrangements, and the use of fewer routers and other 
switching equipment. Because the traffic prioritization offered by 
Comcast to Netflix occurs at interconnection points far upstream 
from last mile delivery, the FCC rules all but ignore the arrange-
ment. 
Companies such as Netflix have opted to pay for peering rather 
than risk the consequences of degraded network delivery of “mis-
sion critical” bandwidth intensive video. The decision by Netflix to 
secure paid peering access to the Comcast network triggered ex-
tensive commentary and analysis.66 Some believe Netflix capitu-
                                                                                                                            
64 See Comcast and Netflix Team Up to Provide Customers Excellent User Experience, 
NETFLIX (Feb. 23, 2014), https://pr.netflix.com/WebClient/getNewsSummary.do?news 
Id=992 [http://perma.cc/X3QY-KQM5]. 
65 Paid peering, for example, resembles normal peering in almost every 
respect, except that one network pays the other network even when 
the exchange of traffic is roughly the same. These more sophisticated 
agreements reflect the fact that while the traffic exchange may be 
equal, the cost of maintaining the networks’ respective 
infrastructures may be unequal. ISPs serving a smaller number of 
large internet content websites (known as “content networks”) have 
lower costs in maintaining their infrastructure than ISPs serving 
home users (“eyeball networks”), since residential neighborhoods 
require more equipment investment (such as wiring) and 
maintenance than commercial areas. These interconnection 
agreements create the economic incentives for ISPs to route internet 
traffic along the lowest-cost paths, which can sometimes have a 
discriminatory effect on certain types of content, applications, and 
services. 
Alexander Reicher, Redefining Net Neutrality After Comcast v. FCC, 26 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 733, 752 (2011). 
66 For a collection of commentaries and critiques, see February 24, 2014 (Netflix Agrees 
to Pay Comcast to End Traffic Jam), BENTON FOUND., https://www.benton.org/node/ 
175252 [http://perma.cc/9W64-432W] (last visited Oct. 6, 2015); February 25, 2014 
(More on Netflix-Comcast and Comcast-TWC), BENTON FOUND., https://www.benton.org/ 
node/175351 [http://perma.cc/3QZG-YKX8] (last visited Oct. 6, 2015); February 26, 
2014 (Comcast-Netflix; Unlocking Cellphones) BENTON FOUND., https://www.benton.org/ 
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lated to extortion by succumbing to thinly veiled threats by retail 
ISPs like Comcast that, absent surcharge payments, Netflix video 
file downloads would regularly trigger congestion and a degraded 
customer experience.67 These observers believe Comcast caused 
Netflix traffic to slow down as a way to extort a surcharge pay-
ment68 from high volume sources of content to help underwrite 
needed network upgrades.69 Others consider paid peering a prag-
matic and commercially wise decision by Netflix to secure en-
hanced QOS delivery guarantees and achieve greater certainty that 
                                                                                                                            
node/175425 [http://perma.cc/4RM8-3HNQ] (last visited Oct. 6, 2015); and February 
27, 2014 (Net Neutrality; Comcast; Wireless), BENTON FOUND., https://www.benton.org/ 
node/175497 [http://perma.cc/B68Z-Y6F9] (last visited Oct. 6, 2015). 
67 From what information is public, it appears that the largest ISPs are 
demanding payment from networks that deliver content and services 
that residential broadband consumers demand. Because the large 
residential ISPs themselves are the ones keeping the terms of their 
deals secret, it is [sic] raises the question of whether they have 
something to hide. 
Bartees Cox Jr., Public Knowledge Raises Concerns over Netflix/Comcast Agreement, PUB. 
KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 23, 2014), https://www.publicknowledge.org/press-release/public-
knowledge-raises-concerns-over-netflixcomca [http://perma.cc/K2R6-XLNF]. 
Alexis Ohanian, startup investor and co-founder of Reddit, lashed out 
at U.S. broadband policy on Thursday, calling on the FCC to 
reclassify internet broadband as “the utility we all know it to be.” 
Ohanian aimed special vitriol at Comcast, affecting a mafia-style voice 
to accuse the cable giant of “legal extortion” for fiddling with Netflix 
speeds until the video site paid it to restore proper service. 
Jeff John Roberts, Comcast “Extortion” Shows the Need to Treat Broadband as a Utility, 
Reddit’s Ohanian Said, GIGAOM (Oct. 16, 2014, 8:31 AM), https://gigaom.com/ 
2014/10/16/comcast-extortion-shows-the-need-to-treat-broadband-as-a-utility-reddits-
ohanian-said/ [http://perma.cc/9CJZ-5AXA]. 
68 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Comcast Versus the Open Internet, NEW YORKER (Feb. 24, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2014/02/comcast-versus-the-free-
internet.html [http://perma.cc/U86G-MXZJ]; see also ISP Speed Index, NETFLIX, 
http://ispspeedindex.netflix.com/country/us (on the ISP Comparison Chart, from field 
for Oct. 2013 and to field for Feb. 2014) [http://perma.cc/6TFA-WXXB] (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2015) (providing Netflix subscribers with a graphical measure of how their ISP 
compares with other carriers in terms of measured bit transmission speed). 
69 See, e.g., Susan Crawford, Introducing the Comcast Tax, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 24, 
2014, 3:24 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-02-24/introducing-the-
comcast-tax [http://perma.cc/EFM3-YERA]. 
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subscribers would not experience degraded service,70 in light of the 
real possibility that Netflix traffic could trigger congestion.71 
The migration from peer to transit, or paid peering partner, 
represents one of many adjustments in interconnection compensa-
tion arrangements triggered by changes in traffic flows.72 Hereto-
fore, commercially driven negotiations have managed the transition 
without resulting in many service disruptions. However, it appears 
increasingly likely that interconnection negotiations will become 
more contentious and protracted,73 particularly when retail ISPs 
demand compensation from sources of high volume, bandwidth 
intensive video content with which the ISPs do not interconnect 
directly. As the Internet becomes a more common medium for the 
                                                                                                                            
70 See, e.g., Rayburn, supra note 51. 
71 Netflix traffic constitutes as much as thirty-four percent of the total volume carried 
by retail ISPs during peak hours. See Drew Fitzgerald, Netflix’s Share of Internet Traffic 
Grows, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2014, 10:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304908304579561802483718502 [http://perma.cc/P4RS-SHGX]. 
72 For background on peering, transit, and new interconnection arrangements, see 
DRPEERING INT’L, http://drpeering.net/index.php [http://perma.cc/RFS7-JQBE] (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2015); Ana-Maria Kovacs, Internet Peering and Transit, TECH. POL’Y INST., 
10–11 (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/amkinternetpeering 
andtransit.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZD4C-RQ8C]; Dennis Weller & Bill Woodcock, Internet 
Traffic Exchange: Market Developments and Policy Challenges, OECD DIGITAL ECON. 
PAPERS, No. 207 (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/ 
internet-traffic-exchange_5k918gpt130q-en [http://perma.cc/KEV2-CJE8]. 
73 By regulating the terms upon which content providers use their 
networks to reach consumers, broadband providers could manipulate 
the flow of information in society. For example, Comcast could 
conceivably block consumer access to websites like 
www.comcastsucks.org that criticize the company. Perhaps more 
realistically, Comcast could block or degrade content and applications 
like Netflix that compete against its other revenue-generating 
services. Unlike America Online and other first-generation dial-up 
Internet access providers, most broadband providers do not specialize 
in providing Internet access alone. Rather, the largest broadband 
providers are cable and telephone companies, which have incentives 
to prevent customers from using their broadband connections in ways 
that threaten their other revenue streams. For example, consumer 
groups have expressed concerns that broadband Internet providers 
that also offer on-demand movie rentals via cable might discriminate 
against other services (such as Netflix or BitTorrent) that make 
movies available over a broadband connection. 
Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and Nondiscrimination Norms in Telecommunications, 54 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2012) (citations omitted). 
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delivery of video content, more compensation disputes will arise 
that have possibly greater potential for consumer inconvenience 
than carriage disputes between content providers and traditional 
media outlets, such as satellite and cable television operators. 
The FCC has delivered a mixed message to prospective dispu-
tants. It has created a regulatory dichotomy between retail ISPs, 
now reclassified as telecommunications service providers, and up-
stream ventures, who retain the largely unregulated information 
service classification if they are not corporate affiliates of the retail 
ISP and do not offer public services. Additionally, the Commission 
has opted not to apply the no blocking, throttling, and paid prioriti-
zation open Internet rules to interconnection between the up-
stream ISPs and retail ISPs.74 Notwithstanding the service classifi-
cation dichotomy and the decision eschewing specific interconnec-
tion rules, the Commission reserves the option to intervene, on a 
case-by-case basis, in the likely event that interconnection and 
compensation disputes occur between upstream carriers and retail 
ISPs.75 
The Commission has created a “no-unreasonable interfe-
rence/disadvantage standard”76 for evaluating both voluntary and 
                                                                                                                            
74 [T]his Order does not apply the open Internet rules to 
interconnection. . . . While we have more than a decade’s worth of 
experience with last-mile practices, we lack a similar depth of 
background in the Internet traffic exchange context. Thus, we find 
that the best approach is to watch, learn, and act as required, but not 
intervene now, especially not with prescriptive rules. 
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, paras. 30–31. 
75 [C]ommercial arrangements for the exchange of traffic with a 
broadband Internet access provider are within the scope of Title II, 
and the Commission will be available to hear disputes raised under 
sections 201 and 202 on a case-by-case basis: an appropriate vehicle 
for enforcement where disputes are primarily over commercial terms 
and that involve some very large corporations, including companies 
like transit providers and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), that 
act on behalf of smaller edge providers. 
Id. para. 29. 
76 Under the no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard: 
[T]he Commission can prohibit practices that unreasonably interfere 
with the ability of consumers or edge providers to select, access, and 
use broadband Internet access service to reach one another, thus 
causing harm to the open Internet. This no-unreasonable 
interference/disadvantage standard will operate on a case-by-case 
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disputed terms and conditions under which retail ISPs and up-
stream carriers cooperate in the routing of broadband traffic. How-
ever, the FCC explicitly states that upstream ISPs and CDNs can 
prioritize traffic77 even though the Commission explicitly prohibits 
this option for retail ISPs. The FCC also exempts interconnection 
between CDNs and retail ISPs from the no-unreasonable interfe-
rence/disadvantage standard of evaluation.78 
The FCC wisely defers to commercial incentives to achieve 
beneficial outcomes, but stands ready to intervene when disputes 
arise, or if a negotiated arrangement violates the Commission’s 
somewhat ambiguous sense of what constitutes an anticompetitive 
practice that harms consumers. The Commission attempts to re-
serve ample flexibility to act and it may have expertly calibrated the 
scope of its possible intervention. On the other hand, it may come 
across as an understatement to note that the FCC has generated 
uncertainty over what commercially negotiated terms and condi-
tions could trigger its intervention. 
II. EXPEDITING DELIVERY OF “MISSION CRITICAL,” 
“MUST SEE” VIDEO BITS 
As the Internet becomes an increasingly important medium for 
the delivery of video, the volume of traffic downloaded increases 
and carriers must expand network capacity to handle the growth. 
The prospect for disputes over compensation increase when down-
stream retail ISPs must regularly upgrade capacity, but believe they 
are inadequately compensated by the ventures that have stimulated 
greater download demand by “binge viewing” broadband subscrib-
ers. While retail ISPs receive compensation from both subscribers 
                                                                                                                            
basis and is designed to evaluate other current or future broadband 
Internet access provider policies or practices—not covered by the 
bright-line rules—and prohibit those that harm the open Internet. 
Id. para. 108. 
77 “We also clarify that the ban on paid prioritization does not restrict the ability of a 
broadband provider and CDN to interconnect.” Id. para. 128. 
78 “Thus, we conclude that, at this time, application of the no-unreasonable 
interference/disadvantage standard and the prohibitions on blocking, throttling, and paid 
prioritization to the Internet traffic exchange arrangements is not warranted.” Id. para. 
195. 
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and upstream ISPs, they have not achieved the same remarkable 
commercial success as other ventures like Google and Netflix 
which use their networks to deliver content to consumers. Accor-
dingly, disputes have arisen and may increase in number when re-
tail ISPs and upstream content sources disagree on the value of the 
delivery service performed. 
As the diversity, value, and volume of downloaded content in-
creases, retail ISPs incur higher costs in delivering the content, and 
accordingly seek ways to secure higher payments.79 For retail sub-
scribers downloading much more content, ISPs can tier service and 
charge higher rates based on the volume of content downloaded in 
a month, rather than offer a single, “all you can eat” (“AYCE”) 
unmetered rate.80 
Rather than consider high volume consumers as pesky “band-
width hogs,” retail ISPs have begun to consider them as favored 
customers in light of the greater revenue and profit, which is gen-
erated by the higher tiered and more expensive services that offer 
faster bit transmission rates and a higher monthly download allot-
ment. The retail broadband access subscription increases in value 
when consumers can substitute on demand video access in lieu of 
“appointment television”81 access to content that is prescribed by 
content creators or distributors at a specific time and available only 
on a single broadcast, satellite, or cable channel. With successful 
migration from unmetered, AYCE service for retail subscribers to a 
tiered and metered system, retail ISPs now have turned their atten-
                                                                                                                            
79 For example, in 2015 two major broadband providers, Comcast and Time Warner, 
raised their cable modem rental rate by twenty-five and thirty-three percent respectively 
to $120 and $96 per year. See Jose Pagliery, Comcast and Time Warner Cable Hike Modem 
Fees as Much as 33%. Time to Buy Your Own, CNNMONEY (Jan. 5, 2015, 2:59 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/02/technology/comcast-time-warner-cable-modem/ 
[http://perma.cc/B8BZ-ULQW]. 
80 See Daniel A. Lyons, Internet Policy’s Next Frontier: Usage-Based Broadband Pricing, 
66 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2013). 
81 “Consumers are changing their viewing habits in favor of ‘TV Everywhere.’ They 
no longer make ‘appointments’ to sit down and view content, and are no longer limited by 
TV programming schedules. They want content whenever and wherever they are.” John 
Clancy, Why the Future of TV Is All About Personalization, MASHABLE (Aug. 25, 2011), 
http://mashable.com/2011/08/25/tv-mobile-personalization/ [http://perma.cc/W8C4-
X9X2]. 
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tion upstream to CDNs and content sources, such as Netflix, for 
higher payments.82 
III. THE WAY FORWARD 
Current and likely future Internet interconnection disputes 
raise many of the same issues as the retransmission consent negoti-
ations between television broadcasters and multichannel video pro-
gramming distributors, such as cable and satellite television opera-
tors.83 Consumers are denied access to desirable video content as a 
result of blackouts when incumbent media ventures fail to reach 
closure by a contractual deadline, and through network congestion 
when retail ISPs will not improve QOS without receiving additional 
compensation. 
Consumers have the right to expect that their significant 
monthly broadband subscription payments entitle them to reliable 
and high quality service that is not contingent on whether the retail 
ISP succeeds in its demands for surcharges from specific carriers 
and content sources. Without a regulatory safeguard, retail ISPs 
can punish holdouts by inconveniencing their consumers with de-
graded service. Most consumers may not know how vulnerable 
their Internet access is to service interruptions, whether caused by 
real or artificial congestion. When an upstream carrier or content 
source refuses to pay a surcharge by generating artificial conges-
tion, the possibility exists that a retail ISP can retaliate.84 IPTV 
viewers have a low pain threshold for degraded service, but they 
have limited recourse in terms of shifting carriers, or demanding a 
speedy resolution to a squabble between their ISP and an upstream 
CDN or content source like Netflix.85 
                                                                                                                            
82 “Today, much Web content is not delivered to the ultimate recipient directly from 
the Web server belonging to the original creator, but via a content delivery network 
(CDN)—a collection of servers that cache the content and deliver it on demand.” David 
D. Clark & Marjory S. Blumenthal, The End-To-End Argument and Application Design: The 
Role of Trust, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 357, 364–65 (2011). 
83 See Rob Frieden, The Costs and Benefits of Regulatory Intervention in Internet Disputes: 
Lessons from Broadcast Signal Retransmission Consent Negotiations, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2015). 
84 See id. at 15. 
85 [T]he Commission found that most residential customers have only 
one or two options for wireline broadband Internet access service, 
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Commercial negotiations, unfettered by regulatory agency 
oversight, constitute the preferred arrangement for parties to antic-
ipate and resolve disputes. However, the likelihood of protracted 
negotiations and outages that are harmful to consumers appears 
increasingly likely, particularly now that substitutes for the tradi-
tional dichotomy of peering or transit have arisen. Consumers, up-
stream ISPs, and content sources need a complaint resolution fo-
rum that can reach timely and fair resolution of predictable dis-
putes. 
Retail ISPs have a right to recoup higher costs, including the 
network upgrades made necessary by increased downloading of 
bandwidth intensive video content. The problem lies in how retail 
ISPs lawfully can recover such costs. The FCC concluded that it 
needed to impose a near absolute bar on paid prioritization, be-
cause some retail ISPs might nudge or force upstream ISPs, CDNs, 
and content sources to pay surcharges for “fast lane” access to 
consumers.86 The Commission appears to discount the possibility 
that retail ISPs might offer QOS enhancements that benefit con-
sumers without harming competition. Retail ISPs ought to have the 
option of offering reasonable types of price and QOS discrimina-
tion, based on actual differences in the cost of service and proof 
that the arrangement will not harm consumers by degrading service 
unless surcharge payments are received. 
Put another way, not all forms of price discrimination and traf-
fic prioritization evidence price gouging and unfair leveraging of 
access to bottleneck facilities. For example, Comcast’s paid peer-
ing arrangement with Netflix provided permissible preferential 
access by providing high level access to Comcast’s nationwide 
network of peering points, normally made available to other major 
carriers.87 Netflix secured enhanced QOS by paying Comcast in its 
                                                                                                                            
increasing the risk of market power, and found the future of mobile 
Internet access service as a competing substitute remained unclear. 
Moreover, the Commission emphasized that customers may incur 
significant costs in switching from one provider to another, thus 
creating “terminating monopolies” for content providers needing 
high-speed broadband service to reach end users. 
Id. at 20 n.78 (quoting 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 24, para. 42). 
86 See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 18. 
87 See Frieden, supra note 83, at 8 n.27. 
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capacity as an upstream ISP or CDN.88 The FCC has not implied 
that such paid peering violates the 2015 Open Internet Order, even 
though the very same type arrangement would constitute imper-
missible paid prioritization had Comcast offered such QOS en-
hancement for last mile delivery of the same content. 
By reclassifying Internet access as a telecommunications ser-
vice, the FCC wants clear statutory authority to prevent unreason-
able discrimination. The Commission considers upstream paid pri-
oritization from retail ISPs as reasonable QOS differentiation, 
while downstream paid prioritization would constitute unlawful 
discrimination. 
A regulatory agency can change its statutory interpretations 
and the regulatory classifications it has made in implementing sta-
tutorily imposed duties. For example, the FCC changed the regula-
tory classification of Digital Subscriber Line service from a tele-
communications service to an information service.89 When making 
a reclassification that triggers less or no regulation, the Commis-
sion receives ample support from stakeholders that benefit from 
lowered or eliminated regulatory costs. 
A reclassification from reduced or nonexistent regulation to 
one that imposes new regulatory oversight will generate substantial 
opposition, legal challenges, and high political costs for the FCC.90 
In both types of reclassifications, the FCC must provide evidence, 
ideally supported with empirical data, to support conclusions that 
                                                                                                                            
88 See id. at 24. 
89 See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities et al., Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC 
Rcd. 14853, para. 5 (2005). 
90 [C]able is willing to embrace the core principles of network neutrality 
with the caveat that it will fight hard—very hard—against any pursuit 
of rules that attempt to change the definition of broadband from an 
information service, as it is today, to a common carrier service. If rule 
makers try to regulate broadband services as common carrier services 
under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, “that’s World 
War III,” [National Telecommunications and Cable Association 
CEO Michael] Powell said. 
Jeff Baumgartner, Powell On NCTA’s 2014 Priorities: “Broadband, Broadband and 
Broadband,” MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Oct. 22, 2013, 4:31 PM), 
http://www.multichannel.com/news/content/powell-ncta-s-2014-priorities-broadband-
broadband-and-broadband/357180 [http://perma.cc/2WFD-E6QG]. 
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changed circumstances favor new or different regulatory require-
ments. Armed with the lawful authority to select from a larger set 
of oversight tools, the FCC must closely calibrate the application of 
new regulatory burdens so that only necessary market-
countervailing rules apply. 
Additionally, the FCC should recognize that having Title II 
regulatory authority does not empower it to prevent any and all 
forms of discriminatory practices. Title II regulated common carri-
ers can offer services, on different terms and conditions, provided 
that any “similarly situated”91 consumer can qualify to become a 
subscriber. This means that even regulated telecommunications 
service providers can engage in certain types of price and QOS dif-
ferentiation. Arguably a “better than best efforts” offering, promis-
ing higher QOS and faster delivery speeds, does not constitute 
“unreasonable” discrimination, the only type of discrimination 
Title II prohibits. 
Unfortunately, the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order does not 
provide sufficient clarity about what types of QOS enhancements 
lawfully can be made available to content providers and on behalf of 
consumers. The Commission states that a retail ISP cannot offer 
paid prioritization that would create a premium fast lane for con-
tent delivery in exchange for “payment (monetary or otherwise) to 
manage its network in a way that benefits particular content, appli-
cations, services, or devices.”92 However, carriers upstream from a 
retail ISP, including major ISPs providing very high capacity 
“backbone service” and CDNs, can offer such QOS enhancement 
based on the rationale that these ventures do not provide access to 
                                                                                                                            
91 [T]he [Communications] Act defines the terms “common carrier” 
and “carrier” to include “any person engaged as a common carrier 
for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or 
radio.” . . . Various regulatory obligations and entitlements set forth 
in the Act—including a prohibition on unjust or unreasonable 
discrimination among similarly situated customers and the 
requirement that all charges, practices, classifications, and regulations 
applied to common carrier service be “just and reasonable”—attach 
only to entities meeting this definition. 
In re IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd. 4863, para. 24 
(2004). 
92 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 18. 
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and from the entire Internet cloud.93 Retail ISPs can seek a waiver 
of the prohibition on paid prioritization, but the 2015 Open Inter-
net Order explicitly imposes a “high bar”94 narrowing this option 
to exceptional cases: 
In support of any waiver request, the applicant 
therefore must make two related showings. First, 
the applicant must demonstrate that the practice 
will have some significant public interest benefit, 
such as providing evidence that the practice furthers 
competition, innovation, consumer demand, or in-
vestment. Second, the applicant must demonstrate 
that the practice does not harm the nature of the 
open Internet, including, but not limited to, provid-
ing evidence that the practice: 
• does not materially degrade or threaten to mate-
rially degrade the broadband Internet access 
service of the general public; 
• does not hinder consumer choice; 
• does not impair competition, innovation, con-
sumer demand, or investment; and 
• does not impede any forms of expressions, types 
of service, or points of view.95 
It appears that an individual content provider or distributor, 
such as Netflix, can lawfully secure a “better than best efforts” 
                                                                                                                            
93 Broadband Internet access service does not include virtual private 
network (VPN) services, content delivery networks (CDNs), hosting 
or data storage services, or Internet backbone services. The 
Commission has historically distinguished these services from “mass 
market” services and, as explained in the 2014 Open Internet NPRM, 
they “do not provide the capability to transmit data to and receive 
data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints.” 
Id. para. 340. 
The FCC opted not to apply any of the open Internet rules to these carriers: “[W]e 
exclude this portion of broadband Internet access service—interconnection with a 
broadband Internet access service provider’s network—from application of our open 
Internet rules. We note that this exclusion also extends to interconnection with CDNs.” 
Id. para. 193. Likewise, the “ban on paid prioritization does not restrict the ability of a 
broadband provider and CDN to interconnect.” Id. para. 128. 
94 Id. para. 132. 
95 Id. para. 131. 
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routing arrangement through paid peering, a type of paid prioritiza-
tion.96 The Commission reports that such payments do achieve 
higher QOS, but notes the controversy when such payments occur 
in light of the possibility that a retail ISP could impose a surcharge 
to abate traffic congestion it artificially created.97 The FCC will rely 
on its complaint resolution process to sort out paid peering ar-
rangements, but apparently, the FCC will not risk an after the fact 
forensic investigation into whether retail ISP paid prioritization 
arrangements can enhance consumer welfare without market dis-
tortion. 
The FCC readily acknowledges that “[c]ontent providers have 
come to rely on the services of commercial and private CDNs, 
which cache content close to end users, providing increased QOS 
and avoiding transit costs.”98 The Commission bars active partici-
pation by retail ISPs, either in coordination with an upstream carri-
er or unilaterally, based on the enhanced risk of harm to competi-
tion and consumers. This risk surely exists, but on the other side of 
the ledger, consumers can benefit from many types of network 
management functions that enhance QOS. 
The FCC should have considered instances where retail ISP 
network management providing better than best efforts routing 
could facilitate the delivery of “must see” video without forcing 
consumers and other carriers to migrate to this more expensive op-
tion. The Commission should not have imposed a near total ban on 
                                                                                                                            
96 Backbone ISPs can barter reciprocal carriage agreements without the transfer of 
money. See id. paras. 197–201. Content providers and distributors can secure similar 
carriage if they offer compensation for “paid peering.” 
97 Some edge and transit providers assert that large broadband Internet 
access service providers are creating artificial congestion by refusing 
to upgrade interconnection capacity at their network entrance points 
for settlement-free peers or CDNs, thus forcing edge providers and 
CDNs to agree to paid peering arrangements. These parties suggest 
that paid arrangements resulting from artificially congested 
interconnection ports at the broadband Internet access service 
provider network edge could create the same consumer harms as paid 
arrangements in the last-mile, and lead to paid prioritization, fast 
lanes, degradation of consumer connections, and ultimately, stifling 
of innovation by edge providers. 
Id. para. 200. 
98 Id. para. 197. 
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paid prioritization by retail ISPs. Rather than assign waiver seekers 
a near impossible burden of proving that a paid prioritization ar-
rangement could never harm anything, the Commission could have 
afforded more flexibility, subject to a combination of transparency, 
reporting, and complaint resolution safeguards to ensure that any 
retail ISP’s QOS enhancement does not harm competitors and 
consumers. The FCC has lawful authority to require carrier disclo-
sure of specialized network arrangements and pricing options as 
part of the Commission’s authority to require transparency into the 
way ISPs do business.99 
Likewise, the FCC can use its conventional dispute resolution 
process in response to complaints submitted to it. Nothing pre-
vents the FCC from investigating and remedying instances of un-
fair competition and trade practices that harm consumers and fru-
strate the Commission’s ability to achieve the goals articulated in 
section 706 of the Communications Act, as amended, which af-
fords ample latitude in identifying and resolving impediments to 
widespread and affordable broadband access.100 
For example, the FCC has clear statutory authority under sec-
tion 706 to require ISPs to satisfy transparency requirements. 
These transparency requirements include requiring ISPs to dis-
                                                                                                                            
99 While reversing the FCC’s nondiscrimination rules as impermissible common 
carrier regulation, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the FCC’s transparency 
requirements. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The FCC’s 
existing transparency requirements state: 
A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access 
service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the 
network management practices, performance, and commercial terms 
of its broadband Internet access services sufficient for consumers to 
make informed choices regarding use of such services and for 
content, application, service, and device providers to develop, 
market, and maintain Internet offerings. 
47 C.F.R. § 8.3 (2015). The 2015 Open Internet Order requires additional disclosure by 
broadband Internet access providers, including information on subscription fees, data 
caps and allowances, network performance and network practices, including specific 
disclosures related to congestion management, application-specific behavior, device 
attachment rules, and security. 
100 “The record amassed by the Commission contains many similar examples, and 
Verizon has given us no basis for questioning the Commission’s determination that the 
preservation of Internet openness is integral to achieving the statutory objectives set forth 
in section 706.” Verizon, 740 F.3d at 645. 
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close network management practices, performance characteristics, 
and the terms and conditions of their broadband services, including 
special arrangements negotiated with one carrier or customer, an 
example of which is the paid peering agreement between Comcast 
and Netflix.101 
A reactive dispute resolution process should abate concerns 
that the FCC has unlimited and intrusive power to regulate the In-
ternet and the commercial terms and conditions of interconnection 
and compensation. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals made it 
clear that while the FCC cannot impose common carrier duties,102 
it does have lawful authority to promote access to the Internet and 
to remove impediments that frustrate achievement of this goal. To 
identify the permissible scope of FCC compelled duties, the court 
devoted considerable attention to a cable television case 
precedent.103 The court concluded that the FCC can impose obliga-
tions to accommodate the needs of a select group of worthy stake-
holders, such as broadcasters, but in the interest of openness and 
nondiscrimination the FCC cannot impose requirements to ac-
commodate a broader, undifferentiated group.104 Additionally, the 
                                                                                                                            
101 Comcast, the country’s largest cable and broadband provider, and 
Netflix, the giant television and movie streaming service, announced 
an agreement Sunday in which Netflix will pay Comcast for faster and 
more reliable access to Comcast’s subscribers. The deal is a milestone 
in the history of the Internet, where content providers like Netflix 
generally have not had to pay for access to the customers of a 
broadband provider. 
Edward Wyatt & Noam Cohen, Comcast and Netflix Reach Deal on Service, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/business/media/comcast-and-
netflix-reach-a-streaming-agreement.html [http://perma.cc/EW3U-6X72]. 
102 “We think it obvious that the Commission would violate the Communications Act 
were it to regulate broadband providers as common carriers.” Verizon, 740 F.3d at 650. 
103 The court cited United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) 
(affirming FCC jurisdiction to regulate cable television and to impose rules restricting 
what signal it can retransmit) and United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 
406 U.S. 649 (1972) (affirming FCC rules requiring certain cable companies to create 
their own programming and maintain facilities for local production). See also Turner 
Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (holding that must-carry obligations satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny of rule impacting cable operator’s First Amendment speech rights); 
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (affirming the duty of cable 
operators to carry significantly viewed local broadcast television signals). 
104 The Midwest Video II cable operators’ primary “customers” were 
their subscribers, who paid to have programming delivered to them in 
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FCC must first defer to commercial negotiations between broad-
casters and cable operators. 
The D.C. Circuit also identified a previous instance where the 
FCC overstepped its statutory authority in the area of compulsory 
carriage. In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II),105 the 
court rejected the FCC mandated access—not by a small group like 
local broadcasters, but by a far larger group of public access chan-
nel lessees—as too much like common carriage.106 The court re-
jected the FCC rules because they usurped the right of cable opera-
tors to make their own decision on how to load their inventory of 
channel capacity.107 
Retail ISPs have a similar right to determine how to load their 
bandwidth and what price to charge, subject to a regulatory dispute 
resolution process that assesses whether an ISP practice would 
have a harmful effect on consumer access to the Internet cloud. 
Section 706 provides the basis for the FCC to examine whether or 
not ISPs have used resource allocation decisions to promote public 
access to widespread and affordable broadband service. 
Unfortunately, the FCC has opted to reclassify broadband In-
ternet access as common carriage, rather than devise remedies that 
require ISPs, as private carriers, to operate with greater transpa-
rency, to disclose service terms and conditions, and to negotiate in 
good faith. While reclassification offers the opportunity for more 
                                                                                                                            
their homes. There, as here, the Commission’s regulations required 
the regulated entities to carry the content of third parties to these 
customers—content the entities otherwise could have blocked at 
their discretion. Moreover, much like the rules at issue here, the 
Midwest Video II regulations compelled the operators to hold open 
certain channels for use at no cost—thus permitting specified 
programmers to “hire” the cable operators’ services for free. Given 
that the cable operators in Midwest Video II were carriers with respect 
to these third-party programmers, we see no basis for concluding that 
broadband providers are not similarly carriers with respect to third-
party edge providers. 
Verizon, 740 F.3d at 654. 
105 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
106 See id. at 708. 
107 “The access rules plainly impose common-carrier obligations on cable operators. 
Under the rules, cable systems are required to hold out dedicated channels on a first-
come, nondiscriminatory basis. Operators are prohibited from determining or influencing 
the content of access programming.” Id. at 701–02 (citations omitted). 
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muscular and clear-cut regulatory oversight, it will reenergize ISPs 
to litigate whether the FCC has engaged in rational decision mak-
ing based on a complete evidentiary record. Such litigation will ex-
tend the period of regulatory uncertainty. 
The FCC has asserted its legal right to reclassify services in 
light of changed circumstances. However, it could have fine-tuned 
and recalibrated its regulatory inventory over private carriers with-
out broadly expanding its wingspan with the promise of forbear-
ance and limited appetite for more extensive oversight. As well, the 
Commission could have prevented possibly harmful regulatory un-
certainty by establishing a simple and clear rule that ISPs can offer 
QOS enhancements that help expedite the delivery of IPTV with-
out degrading their conventional, best efforts traffic routing. 
